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Abstract. Public key encryption with equality test (PKEET) allows
testing whether two ciphertexts are generated by the same message or
not. PKEET is a potential candidate for many practical applications
like efficient data management on encrypted databases. Potential appli-
cability of PKEET leads to intensive research from its first instantiation
by Yang et al. (CT-RSA 2010). Most of the followup constructions are
secure in the random oracle model. Moreover, the security of all the
concrete constructions is based on number-theoretic hardness assump-
tions which are vulnerable in the post-quantum era. Recently, Lee et al.
(ePrint 2016) proposed a generic construction of PKEET schemes in the
standard model and hence it is possible to yield the first instantiation
of PKEET schemes based on lattices. Their method is to use a 2-level
hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) scheme together with a
one-time signature scheme. In this paper, we propose, for the first time,
a direct construction of a PKEET scheme based on the hardness assump-
tion of lattices in the standard model3. More specifically, the security of
the proposed scheme is reduces to the hardness of the Learning With
Errors problem.
1 Introduction
Public key encryption with equality test (PKEET), which was first introduced
by Yang et al. [22], is a special kind of public key encryption that allows any-
one with a given trapdoor to test whether two ciphertexts are generated by the
same message. This property is of use in various practical applications, such
as keyword search on encrypted data, encrypted data partitioning for efficient
encrypted data management, personal health record systems, spam filtering in
encrypted email systems and so on. Due to its numerous practical applications,
3 This is the full version of [6] published in ACISP 2019.
there have been intensive researches in this direction with the appearance of im-
proved schemes or ones with additional functionalities [17,18,19,13,10]. However,
they are all proven to be secure in the random oracle model which does not exist
in reality. Therefore it is necessary to construct such a scheme in the standard
model.
Up to the present, there are only a few PKEET schemes in the standard
model. Lee et al. [9] first proposed a generic construction of a PKEET scheme.
Their method is to use a 2-level hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE)
scheme together with a one-time signature scheme. The HIBE scheme is used
for generating an encryption scheme and for equality test, and the signature
scheme is used for making the scheme CCA2-secure, based on the method of
transforming an identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme to a CCA2-secure en-
cryption scheme of Canetti et al [4]. As a result, they obtain a CCA2-secure
PKEET scheme given that the underlying HIBE scheme is IND-sID-CPA secure
and the one-time signature scheme is strongly unforgeable. From their generic
construction, it is possible to obtain a PKEET in standard model under many
hard assumptions via instantiations. In a very recent paper, Zhang et al. [23]
proposed a direct construction of a CCA2-secure PKEET scheme based on pair-
ings without employing strong cryptographic primitives such as HIBE schemes
and strongly secure signatures as the generic construction of Lee et al. [9]. Their
technique comes from a CCA2-secure public key encryption scheme by [8] which
was directly constructed by an idea from IBE. A comparison with an instantia-
tion from Lee et al. [9] on pairings shows that their direct construction is much
more efficient than the instantiated one.
All aforementioned existing schemes base their security on the hardness of
some number-theoretic assumptions which will be efficiently solved in the quan-
tum era [15]. The generic construction by Lee et al. [9] is the first one with
the possibility of yielding a post-quantum instantiation based on lattices, since
lattice cryptography is the only one among other post-quantum areas up to
present offers HIBE primitives, e.g., [1]. It is then still a question of either yield-
ing an efficient instantiation or directly constructing a PKEET based on lattices.
Our contribution: At ACISP 2019, Duong et al. [6] proposed a direct PKEET
in standard model based on lattices from IBE. However, there scheme is not
CCA2-secure as claimed. In this paper, we revisit and fix the construction to
achieve CCA2-security while still more efficient than the generic construction of
Lee et al. [9]. The techniques are to employ the multi-bit full IBE by Agrawal
et al. [1] and then directly transform it into a PKEET scheme. In our scheme, a
ciphertext is of the form CT = (CT1,CT2,CT3,CT4,CT5,CT6) where (CT1,CT3)
is the encryption of the messagem, as in the original IBE scheme, (CT2,CT4) is
the encryption of H(m) in which H is a hash function, and (CT5,CT6) is the sig-
nature of (CT1,CT2,CT3,CT4) . In order to utilize the IBE scheme, we employ a
second hash function H ′ and create the identity H ′(CT1,CT2) before computing
CT3 and CT4; see Section 3 for more details. Finally, we have proved that the
proposed PKEET scheme is CCA2-secure. We also present in the Appendix the
instantiation of the construction by Lee et al. [9]. As a result, our scheme has
much smaller ciphertext size compared to that of Lee et al. Note that in both
construction, one just needs to generate a one-time signature in the encryption
process which in turn reduces the ciphertext size.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Public key encryption with equality test (PKEET)
In this section, we will recall the model of PKEET and its security model.
We remark that a PKEET system is a multi-user setting. Hence we assume
that in our system throughout the paper, each user is assigned with an index i
with 1 ≤ i ≤ N where N is the number of users in the system.
Definition 1 (PKEET). Public key encryption with equality test (PKEET)
consists of the following polynomial-time algorithms:
– Setup(λ): On input a security parameter λ and set of parameters, it outputs
the a pair of a user’s public key PK and secret key SK.
– Enc(PK,m): On input the public key PK and a message m, it outputs a
ciphertext CT.
– Dec(SK,CT): On input the secret key SK and a ciphertext CT, it outputs a
message m′ or ⊥.
– Td(SKi): On input the secret key SKi for the user Ui, it outputs a trapdoor
tdi.
– Test(tdi, tdj ,CTi,CTj): On input two trapdoors tdi, tdj and two ciphertexts
CTi,CTj for users Ui and Uj respectively, it outputs 1 or 0.
Correctness. We say that a PKEET scheme is correct if the following three
condition hold:
(1) For any security parameter λ, any user Ui and any messagem, it holds that
Pr
[
Dec(SKi,CTi) =m
∣∣∣∣∣ (PKi, SKi)← Setup(λ)CTi ← Enc(PKi,m)
]
= 1.
(2) For any security parameter λ, any users Ui, Uj and any messages mi,mj ,
it holds that:
Pr
Test

tdi
tdj
CTi
CTj
 = 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(PKi, SKi)← Setup(λ)
CTi ← Enc(PKi,mi)
tdi ← Td(SKi)
(PKj , SKj)← Setup(λ)
CTj ← Enc(PKj ,mj)
tdj ← Td(SKj)
 = 1
if mi =mj regardless of whether i = j.
(3) For any security parameter λ, any users Ui, Uj and any messages mi,mj ,
it holds that
Pr
Test

tdi
tdj
CTi
CTj
 = 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(PKi, SKi)← Setup(λ)
CTi ← Enc(PKi,mi)
tdi ← Td(SKi)
(PKj , SKj)← Setup(λ)
CTj ← Enc(PKj ,mj)
tdj ← Td(SKj)

is negligible in λ for any ciphertexts CTi, CTj such that Dec(SKi,CTi) 6=
Dec(SKj ,CTj) regardless of whether i = j.
Security model of PKEET. For the security model of PKEET, we consider
two types of adversaries:
• Type-I adversary: for this type, the adversary can request to issue a trapdoor
for the target user and thus can perform equality tests on the challenge
ciphertext. The aim of this type of adversaries is to reveal the message in
the challenge ciphertext.
• Type-II adversary: for this type, the adversary cannot request to issue a
trapdoor for the target user and thus cannot perform equality tests on the
challenge ciphertext. The aim of this type of adversaries is to distinguish
which message is in the challenge ciphertext between two candidates.
The security model of a PKEET scheme against two types of adversaries above
is described in the following.
OW-CCA2 security against Type-I adversaries. We illustrate the game
between a challenger C and a Type-I adversary A who can have a trapdoor for
all ciphertexts of the target user, say Uθ, that he wants to attack, as follows:
1. Setup: The challenger C runs Setup(λ) to generate the key pairs (PKi, SKi)
for all users with i = 1, · · · , N , and gives {PKi}Ni=1 to A.
2. Phase 1: The adversary A may make queries polynomially many times
adaptively and in any order to the following oracles:
– OSK: an oracle that on input an index i (different from θ), returns the
Ui’s secret key SKi.
– ODec: an oracle that on input a pair of an index i and a ciphertext CTi,
returns the output of Dec(SKi,CTi) using the secret key of the user Ui.
– OTd: an oracle that on input an index i, return tdi by running tdi ←
Td(SKi) using the secret key SKi of the user Ui.
3. Challenge: C chooses a random message m in the message space and run
CT∗θ ← Enc(PKθ,m), and sends CT∗θ to A.
4. Phase 2: A can query as in Phase 1 with the following constraints:
– The index θ cannot be queried to the key generation oracle OSK;
– The pair of the index θ and the ciphertext CT∗θ cannot be queried to the
decryption oracle ODec.
5. Guess: A output m′.
The adversary A wins the above game if m =m′ and the success probability of
A is defined as
AdvOW-CCA2A,PKEET(λ) := Pr[m =m
′].
Remark 2. If the message space is polynomial in the security parameter or the
min-entropy of the message distribution is much lower than the security param-
eter then a Type-I adversary A with a trapdoor for the challenge ciphertext can
reveal the message in polynomial-time or small exponential time in the security
parameter, by performing the equality tests with the challenge ciphertext and
all other ciphertexts of all messages generated by himself. Hence to prevent this
attack, we assume that the size of the message space M is exponential in the se-
curity parameter and the min-entropy of the message distribution is sufficiently
higher than the security parameter.
IND-CCA2 security against Type-II adversaries. We present the game
between a challenger C and a Type-II adversary A who cannot have a trapdoor
for all ciphertexts of the target user Uθ as follows:
1. Setup: The challenger C runs Setup(λ) to generate the key pairs (PKi, SKi)
for all users with i = 1, · · · , N , and gives {PKi}Ni=1 to A.
2. Phase 1: The adversary A may make queries polynomially many times
adaptively and in any order to the following oracles:
– OSK: an oracle that on input an index i (different from t), returns the
Ui’s secret key SKi.
– ODec: an oracle that on input a pair of an index i and a ciphertext CTi,
returns the output of Dec(SKi,CTi) using the secret key of the user Ui.
– OTd: an oracle that on input an index i (different from t), return tdi by
running tdi ← Td(SKi) using the secret key SKi of the user Ui.
3. Challenge: A chooses two messages m0 m1 of same length and pass to C,
who then selects a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}, runs CT∗θ,b ← Enc(PKθ,mb) and
sends CT∗θ,b to A.
4. Phase 2: A can query as in Phase 1 with the following constraints:
– The index t cannot be queried to the key generation oracle OSK and the
trapdoor generation oracle OTd;
– The pair of the index θ and the ciphertext CT∗θ,b cannot be queried to
the decryption oracle ODec.
5. Guess: A output b′.
The adversary A wins the above game if b = b′ and the advantage of A is defined
as
AdvIND-CCA2A,PKEET :=
∣∣∣∣Pr[b = b′]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
2.2 Lattices
Throughout the paper, we will mainly focus on integer lattices, which are discrete
subgroups of Zm. Specially, a lattice Λ in Zm with basis B = [b1, · · · ,bn] ∈
Z
m×n, where each bi is written in column form, is defined as
Λ :=
{
n∑
i=1
bixi|xi ∈ Z ∀i = 1, · · · , n
}
⊆ Zm.
We call n the rank of Λ and if n = m we say that Λ is a full rank lattice. In
this paper, we mainly consider full rank lattices containing qZm, called q-ary
lattices, defined as the following, for a given matrix A ∈ Zn×m and u ∈ Znq
Λq(A) :=
{
e ∈ Zm s.t. ∃s ∈ Znq where ATs = e mod q
}
Λ⊥q (A) := {e ∈ Zm s.t. Ae = 0 mod q}
Λuq (A) := {e ∈ Zm s.t. Ae = u mod q}
Note that if t ∈ Λuq (A) then Λuq (A) = Λ⊥q (A) + t.
Let S = {s1, · · · , sk} be a set of vectors in Rm. We denote by ‖S‖ :=
maxi ‖si‖ for i = 1, · · · , k, the maximum l2 length of the vectors in S. We also
denote S˜ := {s˜1, · · · , s˜k} the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization of the vectors
s1, · · · , sk in that order. We refer to ‖S˜‖ the Gram-Schmidt norm of S.
Ajtai [2] first proposed how to sample a uniform matrix A ∈ Zn×mq with an
associated basis SA of Λ
⊥
q (A) with low Gram-Schmidt norm. It is improved later
by Alwen and Peikert [3] in the following Theorem.
Theorem 1. Let q ≥ 3 be odd and m := ⌈6n log q⌉. There is a probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithm TrapGen(q, n) that outputs a pair (A ∈ Zn×mq , S ∈
Z
m×m) such that A is statistically close to a uniform matrix in Zn×mq and S is
a basis for Λ⊥q (A) satisfying
‖S˜‖ ≤ O(
√
n log q) and ‖S‖ ≤ O(n log q)
with all but negligible probability in n.
Definition 1 (Gaussian distribution). Let Λ ⊆ Zm be a lattice. For a vector
c ∈ Rm and a positive parameter σ ∈ R, define:
ρσ,c(x) = exp
(
π
‖x− c‖2
σ2
)
and ρσ,c(Λ) =
∑
x∈Λ
ρσ,c(x).
The discrete Gaussian distribution over Λ with center c and parameter σ is
∀y ∈ Λ , DΛ,σ,c(y) = ρσ,c(y)
ρσ,c(Λ)
.
For convenience, we will denote by ρσ and DΛ.σ for ρ0,σ and DΛ,σ,0 respec-
tively. When σ = 1 we will write ρ instead of ρ1. We recall below in Theorem 2
some useful results. The first one is from [5] and formulated in [1, Theorem 17].
The second one from [1, Theorem 19] and the last one is from [1, Corollary 30].
Theorem 2. Let q > 2 and let A,B be a matrix in Zn×mq with m > n and B
is rank n. Let TA, TB be a basis for Λ
⊥
q (A) and Λ
⊥
q (B) respectively. Then for
c ∈ Rm and U ∈ Zn×tq :
1. Let M be a matrix in Zn×m1q and σ ≥ ‖T˜A‖ω(
√
log(m+m1)). Then there
exists a PPT algorithm SampleLeft(A,M, TA, U, σ) that outputs a matrix e ∈
Z
(m+m1)×t distributed statistically close to DΛUq (F1),σ where F1 := (A | M).
In particular e ∈ ΛUq (F1), i.e., F1 · e = U mod q.
2. Let M be a matrix in Zn×m1q and σ ≥ ‖T˜A‖ω(
√
log(m+m1)). Then there
exists a PPT algorithm SampleBasisLeft(A,M, TA, σ) that outputs a basis TF1
for Λ⊥q (F1) where F1 := (A | M), provided that A is of rank n.
3. Let R be a matrix in Zk×m and let sR := sup‖x‖=1 ‖Rx‖. Let F2 := (A | AR+
B). Then for σ ≥ ‖T˜B‖sRω(
√
logm), there exists a PPT algorithm
SampleRight(A,B,R, TB, U, σ) that outputs a matrix e ∈ Z(m+k)×t distributed
statistically close to DΛUq (F2),σ. In particular e ∈ Λuq (F2), i.e., F2 · e = U
mod q.
Note that when R is a random matrix in {−1, 1}m×m then sR < O(
√
m)
with overwhelming probability (cf. [1, Lemma 15]).
The security of our construction reduces to the LWE (Learning With Errors)
problem introduced by Regev [14].
Definition 2 (LWE problem). Consider publicly a prime q, a positive integer
n, and a distribution χ over Zq. An (Zq, n, χ)-LWE problem instance consists of
access to an unspecified challenge oracle O, being either a noisy pseudorandom
sampler Os associated with a secret s ∈ Znq , or a truly random sampler O$ who
behaviors are as follows:
Os: samples of the form (ui, vi) = (ui,uTi s + xi) ∈ Znq × Zq where s ∈ Znq is a
uniform secret key, ui ∈ Znq is uniform and xi ∈ Zq is a noise withdrawn
from χ.
O$: samples are uniform pairs in Znq × Zq.
The (Zq, n, χ)-LWE problem allows responds queries to the challenge oracle O.
We say that an algorithm A decides the (Zq , n, χ)-LWE problem if
AdvLWEA :=
∣∣Pr[AOs = 1]− Pr[AO$ = 1]∣∣
is non-negligible for a random s ∈ Znq .
Regev [14] showed that (see Theorem 3 below) when χ is the distribution Ψα
of the random variable ⌊qX⌉ mod q where α ∈ (0, 1) and X is a normal random
variable with mean 0 and standard deviation α/
√
2π then the LWE problem is
hard.
Theorem 3. If there exists an efficient, possibly quantum, algorithm for decid-
ing the (Zq, n, Ψα)-LWE problem for q > 2
√
n/α then there is an efficient quan-
tum algorithm for approximating the SIVP and GapSVP problems, to within
O˜(n/α) factors in the l2 norm, in the worst case.
Hence if we assume the hardness of approximating the SIVP and GapSVP
problems in lattices of dimension n to within polynomial (in n) factors, then it
follows from Theorem 3 that deciding the LWE problem is hard when n/α is a
polynomial in n.
3 Our PKEET construction
3.1 Construction
Setup(λ) : On input a security parameter λ, set the parameters q, n,m, σ, α as
in section 3.2
1. Use TrapGen(q, n) to generate uniformly random n×m-matrices A,A′ ∈
Z
n×m
q together with trapdoors TA and TA′ respectively.
2. Select l + 1 uniformly random n×m matrices A1, · · · , Al, B ∈ Zn×mq .
3. Let H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}t and H ′ : {0, 1}∗ → {−1, 1}l be hash functions.
4. Select a uniformly random matrix U ∈ Zn×tq .
5. Output the public key and the secret key
PK = (A,A′, A1, · · · , Al, B, U) , SK = (TA, TA′).
Encrypt(PK,m) : On input the public key PK and a message m ∈ {0, 1}t, do:
1. Choose a uniformly random s1, s2 ∈ Znq
2. Choose x1,x2 ∈ Ψ tα and compute4
c1 = U
T s1 + x1 +m
⌊q
2
⌋
, c2 = U
T s2 + x2 +H(m)
⌊q
2
⌋ ∈ Ztq.
3. Compute b = H ′(c1‖c2) ∈ {−1, 1}l, and set
F1 = (A|B +
l∑
i=1
biAi) , F2 = (A
′|B +
l∑
i=1
biAi).
4. Choose l uniformly random matrices Ri ∈ {−1, 1}m×m for i = 1, · · · , l
and define R =
∑l
i=1 biRi ∈ {−l, · · · , l}m×m.
5. Choose y1,y2 ∈ Ψmα and set z1 = RTy1, z2 = RTy2 ∈ Zmq .
6. Compute
c3 = F
T
1 s1 + [y
T
1 |zT1 ]T , c4 = FT2 s2 + [yT2 |zT2 ]T ∈ Z2mq .
7. Generate (D,TD)← TrapGen(q, n).
4 Note that for a message m ∈ {0, 1}t, we choose a random binary string m′ of fixed
length t′ large enough and by abusing of notation, we write H(m) for H(m′‖m).
8. Compute d = H ′(c1‖c2‖c3‖c4) ∈ {−1, 1}l and set
F3 = (D|B +
l∑
i=1
diAi) ∈ Zn×2mq .
9. Sample u ∈ Z2m from
u← SampleLeft(D,B +
l∑
i=1
diAi, TD, 0, σ).
Note that F3 · u = 0 mod q.
10. The ciphertext is
CT = (c1, c2, c3, c4,u, D) ∈ Z2t+6mq × Zn×mq .
Decrypt(PK, SK,CT) : On input public key PK, private key SK and a ciphertext
CT = (c1, c2, c3, c4,u, D), do:
1. Compute d = H ′(c1‖c2‖c3‖c4) ∈ {−1, 1}l and set
F3 = (D|B +
l∑
i=1
diAi) ∈ Zn×2mq .
2. Check whether F3 · u = 0 mod q. If not then returns ⊥; Otherwise,
continue to Step 3.
3. Compute b = H ′(c1‖c2) ∈ {−1, 1}l and sample e ∈ Z2m×t from
e← SampleLeft(A,B +
l∑
i=1
biAi, TA, U, σ).
Note that F1 · e = U in Zn×tq .
4. Compute w← c1 − eT c3 ∈ Ztq.
5. For each i = 1, · · · , t, compare wi and ⌊ q2⌋. If they are close, output
mi = 1 and otherwise output mi = 0. We then obtain the message m.
6. Sample e′ ∈ Z2m×t from
e′ ← SampleLeft(A′, B +
l∑
i=1
biAi, TA′ , U, σ).
7. Compute w′ ← c2 − (e′)T c4 ∈ Ztq.
8. For each i = 1, · · · , t, compare w′i and ⌊ q2⌋. If they are close, output
hi = 1 and otherwise output hi = 0. We then obtain the vector h.
9. If h = H(m) then output m, otherwise output ⊥.
Trapdoor(SKi) : On input a user Ui’s secret key SKi = (Ki,1,Ki,2), it outputs
a trapdoor tdi = Ki,2.
Test(tdi, tdj ,CTi,CTj) : On input trapdoors tdi, tdj and ciphertexts CTi,CTj
for users Ui, Uj respectively, computes
1. For each i (resp. j), do the following:
– Compute bi = H
′(ci1‖ci2) = (bi1, · · · , bil) and sample ei ∈ Z2m×t
from
ei ← SampleLeft(A′i, Bi +
l∑
k=1
bikAik, TA′
i
, Ui, σ).
Note that Fi2 · ei = Ui in Zn×tq .
– Compute wi ← ci2 − eTi ci4 ∈ Ztq. For each k = 1, · · · , t, compare
each coordinate wik with ⌊ qw ⌋ and output hik = 1 if they are close,
and 0 otherwise. At the end, we obtain the vector hi (resp. hj).
2. Output 1 if hi = hj and 0 otherwise.
Theorem 4. Our PKEET construction above is correct if H is a collision-
resistant hash function.
Proof. It is easy to see that if CT is a valid ciphertext of m then the decryption
will always outputm. Moreover, if CTi and CTj are valid ciphertext ofm andm
′
of user Ui and Uj respectively. Then the Test process checks whether H(m) =
H(m′). If so then it outputs 1, meaning that m = m′, which is always correct
with overwhelming probability since H is collision resistant. Hence our PKEET
described above is correct.
3.2 Parameters
We follow [1, Section 7.3] for choosing parameters for our scheme. Now for the
system to work correctly we need to ensure
– the error term in decryption is less than q/5 with high probability, i.e.,
q = Ω(σm3/2) and α < [σlmω(
√
logm)]−1,
– that the TrapGen can operate, i.e., m > 6n log q,
– that σ is large enough for SampleLeft and SampleRight, i.e., σ > lmω(
√
logm),
– that Regev’s reduction applies, i.e., q > 2
√
n/α,
– that our security reduction applies (i.e., q > 2Q where Q is the number of
identity queries from the adversary).
Hence the following choice of parameters (q,m, σ, α) from [1] satisfies all of the
above conditions, taking n to be the security parameter:
m = 6n1+δ , q = max(2Q,m2.5ω(
√
logn))
σ = mlω(
√
logn) , α = [l2m2ω(
√
logn)]
(1)
and round up m to the nearest larger integer and q to the nearest larger prime.
Here we assume that δ is such that nδ > ⌈log q⌉ = O(log n).
3.3 Security analysis
In this section, we will prove that our proposed scheme is OW-CCA2 secure
against Type-I adversaries (cf. Theorem 5) and IND-CCA2 secure against Type-
II adversaries (cf. Theorem 6).
Theorem 5. The PKEET with parameters (q, n,m, σ, α) as in (1) is OW-CCA2
secure provided that H is a one-way hash function, H ′ is a collision-resistant
hash function, and the (Zq, n, Ψ¯α)-LWE assumption holds. In particular, sup-
pose there exists a probabilistic algorithm A that wins the OW-CCA2 game with
advantage ǫ, then there is a probabilistic algorithm B that solves the (Zq, n, Ψ¯α)-
LWE problem with advantage ǫ′ such that
ǫ′ ≥ 1
2q
(
ǫ− 1
2
ǫH′,CR − ǫH,OW
)
.
Here ǫH′,CR is the advantage of breaking the collision resistance of H
′ and ǫH,OW
is the advantage of breaking the one-wayness of H.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of [1, Theorem 25]. Assume that there
is a Type-I adversary A who breaks the OW-CCA2 security of the PKKET
scheme with non-negligible probability ǫ. We construct an algorithm B who
solves the LWE problem using A. Assume again that there are N users in
our PKEET system. We now describe the behaviors of B. Assume that θ is
the target index of the adversary A and the challenge ciphertext is CT∗θ =
(CT∗θ,1,CT
∗
θ,2,CT
∗
θ,3,CT
∗
θ,4,CT
∗
θ,5,CT
∗
θ,6).
We will proceed the proof in a sequence of games. In game i, let Wi denote
the event that the adversary A win the game. The adversary’s advantage in
Game i is Pr[Wi].
Game 0. This is the original OW-CCA2 game between the attacker A against
the scheme and the OW-CCA2 challenger.
Game 1. This is similar to Game 0 except that in Phase 2 of Game 1, if
the adversary queries the decryption oracel ODec(θ) of a ciphertext CTθ =
(CTθ,1,CTθ,2,CTθ,3,CTθ,4,CTθ,5,CTθ,6) such that H
′(CTθ,1‖CTθ,2) = b∗,
where b∗ = H ′(CT∗θ,1‖CT∗θ,2), but CTθ 6= CT∗θ then the challenger aborts
the game and returns a random guess. We denote this event by E1. In this
event, the adversary has found a collision for the hash func tion H ′ and so
Pr[E1] ≤ ǫH′,CR
where ǫH′CR is the advantage of the adversary A against the collision resis-
tance of H ′. Now the advantage of A in Game 1 is
Pr[W1] = Pr[W1|E1]Pr[E1] + Pr[W1|¬E1]Pr[¬E1]
=
1
2
Pr[E1] + Pr[W0 ∩ ¬E1]
=
1
2
Pr[E1] + Pr[W0]− Pr[W0 ∩ E1]
≥ Pr[W0]− 1
2
Pr[E1]
≥ Pr[W0]− 1
2
ǫH′,CR
and hence
Pr[W0]− Pr[W1] ≤ 1
2
ǫH′,CR.
Game 2. This is similar to Game 1 except that at the challenge phase, B chooses
two message m and m′ in the message space and encrypt m in CTθ,1 and
H(m′) in CTθ,2. Other steps are similar to Game 1. Here we can not expect
the behavior of A. And since A has a trapdoor TA′ and he can obtain H(m′).
At the end if A outputs m′, call this event E2, then A has broken the one-
wayness of the hash function H . Thus
Pr[E2] ≤ ǫH,OW
where ǫH,OW is the advantage of A in breaking the one-wayness of H . There-
fore we have
Pr[W2] = Pr[W2|E2]Pr[E2] + Pr[W2|¬E2]Pr[¬E2]
= Pr[W2|E2]Pr[E2] + Pr[W1]Pr[¬E2]
≥ 1|M|Pr[E2] + Pr[W1]− Pr[W1]Pr[E2]
≥ Pr[W1]− Pr[E2]
≥ Pr[W1]− ǫH,OW
and hence
Pr[W1]− Pr[W2] ≤ ǫH,OW.
Game 3. This is similar to Game 2 except the way the challenger B gener-
ates the public key for the user with index θ, as the following. Let R∗i ∈
{−1, 1}m×m for i = 1, · · · , l be the ephemeral random matrices generated
for the creation of the ciphertext CT∗θ. In this game, the challenger chooses l
matrices R∗i uniformly random in {−1, 1}m×m and chooses l random scalars
hi ∈ Zq for i = 1, · · · , l. Then it generates A,A′ and B as in Game 1 and
constructs the matrices Ai for i = 1, · · · , l as
Ai ← A ·R∗i − hi ·B ∈ Zn×mq .
The remainder of the game is unchanged with R∗i , i = 1, · · · , l, used to
generate the challenge ciphertext. Similar to the proof of [1, Theorem 25] we
have that the Ai are close to uniform and hence they are random independent
matrices in the view of the adversary as in Game 0. Therefore
Pr[W3] = Pr[W2].
Game 4. Game 4 is similar to Game 3 except that we add an abort that is
independent of adversary’s view. The challenger behaves as follows:
– The setup phase is identical to Game 3 except that the challenger also
chooses random hi ∈ Zq, i = 1, · · · , l and keeps it to itself.
– In the final guess phase, the adversary outputs a guest m′ for m. The
challenger now does the following:
1. Abort check: for all queries CT = (CT1,CT2,CT3,CT4,CTθ,5,CTθ,6)
to the decryption oracle ODec, the challenger checks whether b =
H ′(CT1‖CT2) satisfies 1 +
∑h
i=1 bihi 6= 0 and 1 +
∑h
i=1 b
∗
i hi = 0
where b∗ = H ′(CT∗θ,1‖CT∗θ,2). If not then the challenger aborted the
game.
2. Artificial abort: the challenger samples a message Γ such that
Pr[Γ = 1] is calculated through a function G (defined as in [1]) eval-
uated through all the queries of A. If Γ = 1 the challenger overwrite
γ′ with a fresh random bit and we say that the challenger aborted
the game due to artificial abort; see [1] for more details.
A similar proof as in that of [1, Theorem 25] yields that
Pr[W4] ≥ 1
2q
Pr[W3].
Game 5. We now change the way how A and B are generated in Game 4.
In Game 5, A is a random matrix in Zn×mq and B is generated through
TrapGen(q, n) together with an associated trapdoor TB for Λ
⊥
q (B). The con-
struction of Ai for i = 1, · · · , l remains the same as in Game 3, i.e., Ai =
AR∗i −hiB. When A queries ODec(θ,CTθ) where CTθ = (CTθ,1,CTθ,2,CTθ,3,
CTθ,4,CTθ,5,CTθ,6), B performs as follows:
– B computes b = H ′(CTθ,1‖CTθ,2) ∈ {−1, 1}l and set
Fθ := (A|B +
l∑
i=1
Ai) = (A|AR + hθB)
where
R←
l∑
i=1
biR
∗
i ∈ Zn×mq and hθ ← 1 +
l∑
i=1
bihi ∈ Zq. (2)
– If hθ = 0 then abort the game and pretend that the adversary outputs
a random bit γ′ as in Game 3.
– Set e ← SampleRight(A, hθB,R, TB, U, σ) ∈ Z2m×tq . Note that since hθ
is non-zero, and so TB is also a trapdoor for hθB. And hence the output
e satisfies Fθ · e = U in Ztq. Moreover, Theorem 2 shows that when
σ > ‖T˜B‖sRω(
√
m) with sR := ‖R‖, the generated e is distributed close
to DΛUq (Fθ) as in Game 3.
– Compute w ← CTθ,1− eTCTθ,3 ∈ Ztq. For each i = 1, · · · , t, compare wi
with ⌊ q2⌋, and output 1 if they are close, and output 0 otherwise. Then
B can answer the decryption query ODec(θ,CTθ) made by A.
Game 5 is otherwise the same as Game 4. In particular, in the challenge
phase, the challenger checks if b∗ satisfies 1 +
∑l
i=1 bihi = 0. If not, the
challenger aborts the game as in Game 4. Similarly, in Game 5, the challenger
also implements an artificial abort in the guess phase. Since Game 4 and
Game 5 are identical in the adversary’s view, we have that
Pr[W5] = Pr[W4].
Game 6. Game 6 is identical to Game 5, except that the challenge ciphertext
is always chosen randomly. And thus the advantage of A is always 0.
We now show that Game 5 and Game 6 are computationally indistinguishable.
If the abort event happens then the games are clearly indistinguishable. We,
therefore, consider only the queries that do not cause an abort.
Suppose now A has a non-negligible advantage in distinguishing Game 5 and
Game 6. We use A to construct B to solve the LWE problem as follows.
Setup. First of all, B requests from O and receives, for each j = 1, · · · , t a
fresh pair (ai, di) ∈ Znq ×Zq and for each i = 1, · · · ,m, a fresh pair (ui, vi) ∈
Z
n
q ×Zq. A announces an index θ for the target user. B executes (PKi, SKi)←
Setup(λ) for 1 ≤ i 6= θ ≤ N . Then B constructs the public key for user of
index θ as follows:
1. Assemble the random matrix A ∈ Zn×mq from m of previously given
LWE samples by letting the i-th column of A to be the n-vector ui for
all i = 1, · · · ,m.
2. Assemble the first t unused LWE samples a1, · · · , at to become a public
random matrix U ∈ Zn×tq .
3. Run TrapGen(q, σ) to generate uniformly random matrices A′, B ∈ Zn×mq
together with their trapdoor TA′ and TB respectively.
4. Choose l random matrices R∗i ∈ {−1, 1}m×m for i = 1, · · · , l and l
random scalars hi ∈ Zq for i = 1, · · · , l. Next it constructs the matrices
Ai for i = 1, · · · , l as
Ai ← AR∗i − hiB ∈ Zn×mq .
Note that it follows from the leftover hash lemma [16, Theorem 8.38]
that A1, · · · , Al are statistically close to uniform.
5. Set PKθ := (A,A
′, A1, · · · , Al, B, U) to A.
Then B sends the public keys {PKi}Ni=1 to the adversary A.
Queries. B answers the queries as in Game 4, including aborting the game if
needed.
Challenge. Now B chooses random messages m∗ and computes the challenge
ciphertext CT∗θ = (CT
∗
θ,1,CT
∗
θ,2,CT
∗
θ,3,CT
∗
θ,4,CT
∗
θ,5,CT
∗
θ,6) as follows:
1. Assemble d1, · · · , dt, v1, · · · , vm from the entries of LWE samples to form
d∗ = [d1, · · · , dt]T ∈ Ztq and v∗ = [v1, · · · , vm]T ∈ Zmq .
2. Set CT∗θ,1 ← d∗ +m∗⌊ q2⌋ ∈ Ztq.
3. Choose a uniformly random s2 ∈ Znq and x2 ← Ψ
t
α, compute
CT∗θ,2 ← UT s2 + x2 +H(m∗)⌊
q
2
⌋ ∈ Ztq.
4. Compute b∗ = H ′(CT∗θ,1‖CT∗θ,2) ∈ {−1, 1}l and R∗ :=
∑l
i=1 b
∗
iR
∗
i ∈
{−l, · · · , l}m×m.
5. Set
CT∗θ,3 :=
[
v∗
(R∗)Tv∗
]
∈ Z2mq .
6. Choose y2 ← Ψmα and set
CT∗θ,4 :=
[
(A′)T s2 + y2
(AR∗)T s2 + (R
∗)Ty2
]
∈ Z2mq .
7. Compute d = H ′(CT∗θ,1‖CT∗θ,2‖CT∗θ,3‖CT∗θ,4) ∈ {−1, 1}l, choose a uni-
formly random D ← Zn×mq and set
F3 = (D|B +
l∑
i=1
d∗iAi) ∈ Zn×2mq .
8. Set R′ :=
∑l
i=1 diR
∗
i and compute u ∈ Z2m from
u← SampleRight(D,B,R′, TB, 0, σ).
9. Set CT∗θ,5 := u and CT
∗
θ,6 := D.
Then B sends CT∗θ = (CT∗θ,1,CT∗θ,2,CT∗θ,3,CT∗θ,4,CT∗θ,5,CT∗θ,6) to A.
Note that in case of no abort, one has hθ = 0 and so Fθ = (A|AR∗). When
the LWE oracle is pseudorandom, i.e., O = Os then v∗ = AT s+ y for some
random noise vector y← Ψmα . Therefore CT∗0,3 in Step 5 satisfies:
CT∗θ,3 :=
[
AT s+ y
(AR∗)T s+ (R∗)Ty
]
= (Fθ)
T s+
[
y
(R∗)Ty
]
.
Moreover, d∗ = UT s+ x for some x← Ψ tα and therefore
CT∗θ,1 = U
T s+ x+m∗⌊ q
2
⌋.
One can easily see that
CT∗θ,4 = [A
′|AR∗]T s2 +
[
y2
(R∗)Ty2
]
.
Therefore CT∗θ is a valid ciphertext.
When O = O$ we have that d∗ is uniform in Ztq and v∗ is uniform in Zmq .
Then obviously CT∗θ,1 is uniform. It follows also from the leftover hash lemma
(cf. [16, Theorem 8.38]) that CT∗θ,3 is also uniform.
Guess. After Phase 2, A guesses if it is interacting with a Game 5 or Game 6.
The simulator also implements the artificial abort from Game 5 and Game
6 and output the final guess as the answer to the LWE problem.
We have seen above that when O = Os then the adversary’s view is as in
Game 5. When O = O$ then the view of adversary is as in Game 6. Hence the
advantage ǫ′ of B in solving the LWE problem is the same as the advantage of
A in distinguishing Game 5 and Game 6. Since Pr[W6] = 0, we have
Pr[W5] = Pr[W5]− Pr[W6] ≤ ǫ′.
Hence combining the above results, we obtain that
ǫ = Pr[W0] ≤ 1
2
ǫH′,CR + ǫH,OW + 2qǫ
′
which implies
ǫ′ ≥ 1
2q
(
ǫ − 1
2
ǫH′,CR − ǫH,OW
)
as desired.
Theorem 6. The PKEET with parameters (q, n,m, σ, α) as in (1) is IND-CCA2
secure provided that H ′ is a collision-resistant hash function, and the (Zq, n, Ψ¯α)-
LWE assumption holds. In particular, suppose there exists a probabilistic algo-
rithm A that wins the IND-CCA2 game with advantage ǫ, then there is a prob-
abilistic algorithm B that solves the (Zq, n, Ψ¯α)-LWE problem with advantage ǫ′
such that
ǫ′ ≥ 1
4q
(
ǫ− 1
2
ǫH′,CR
)
where ǫH′,CR is the advantage of A in breaking the collision resistance of H ′.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 5. Assume that there is a Type-II
adversaryA who breaks the IND-CCA2 security of the PKKET scheme with non-
negligible probability ǫ. We construct an algorithm B who solves the LWE prob-
lem usingA. Assume again that there areN users in our PKEET system. We now
describe the behavior of B. Assume that θ is the target index of the adversary A
and the challenge ciphertext is CT∗θ = (CT
∗
θ,1,CT
∗
θ,2,CT
∗
θ,3,CT
∗
θ,4,CT
∗
θ,5,CT
∗
θ,6).
We will proceed the proof in a sequence of games. In game i, letWi denote the
event that the adversary A correctly guesses the challenge bit. The adversary’s
advantage in Game i is
∣∣Pr[Wi]− 12 ∣∣.
Game 0. This is the original IND-CCA2 game between the attacker A against
the scheme and the IND-CCA2 challenger.
Game 1. This is similar to Game 1 in the proof of Theorem 5. Thus the ad-
vantage of A in Game 1 is∣∣∣∣Pr[W0]− 12
∣∣∣∣− ∣∣∣∣Pr[W1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 12 ǫH′,CR.
Game 2. This is similar to Game 3 in the proof of Theorem 5 and we have
Pr[W2] = Pr[W1].
Game 3. Game 3 is similar to Game 2 except that we add an abort as in the
proof of Theorem 5. It follows from the proof of [1, Theorem 25] that∣∣∣∣Pr[W3]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≥ 14q
∣∣∣∣Pr[W2]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
Game 4. This game is similar to Game 5 in the proof of Theorem 5, and we
have
Pr[W3] = Pr[W4].
Game 5. Game 5 is identical to Game 4, except that the challenge ciphertext
is always chosen randomly. And thus the advantage of A is always 0.
We now show that Game 4 and Game 5 are computationally indistinguishable.
If the abort event happens then the games are clearly indistinguishable. We,
therefore, consider only the queries that do not cause an abort.
Suppose now A has a non-negligible advantage in distinguishing Game 4 and
Game 5. We use A to construct B to solve the LWE problem similar to the
proof of Theorem 5. Note that in the IND-CCA2 game, we allow the adversary
to query the trapdoor oracle OTd. And since we generate A′ together with TA′
from TrapGen(q, n) and we can answer TA′ to such queries.
We have seen above that when O = Os then the adversary’s view is as in
Game 4. When O = O$ then the view of the adversary is as in Game 5. Hence
the advantage ǫ′ of B in solving the LWE problem is the same as the advantage
of A in distinguishing Game 4 and Game 5. Since Pr[W5] = 12 , we have∣∣∣∣Pr[W4]− 12
∣∣∣∣ = |Pr[W4]− Pr[W5]| ≤ ǫ′.
Hence combining the above results, we obtain that
ǫ =
∣∣∣∣Pr[W0]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 12 ǫH′,CR + 4qǫ′
which implies
ǫ′ ≥ 1
4q
(
ǫ− 1
2
ǫH′,CR
)
as desired.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a direct construction of PKEET based on the hardness
of Learning With Errors problem. Efficiency is the reason to avoid the instanti-
ation of lattice-based PKEET from the generic construction by Lee et al. [9]. A
concrete instantiation from [9] and comparative study are left for the complete
version. In addition, our PKEET scheme can be further improved by utilizing
improved IBE schemes [20,21] together with the efficient trapdoor generation [11]
and faster Gaussian sampling technique [7], which we leave as future work.
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Appendix A: An instantiation of Lee et al.’s construction
In this section, we will present a lattice-based PKEET which is an instantiation
of the Lee et al.’s construction [9]. In their generic construction, they need (i)
a multi-bit HIBE scheme and (ii) an one-time signature scheme. To instantiate
their construction, we modify the lattice based single-bit HIBE of [1] to multi-bit
one and use it, along with the signature scheme, to have following construction of
lattice based PKEET. Even though one needs only a one-time signature scheme,
we choose the full secure signature scheme from [1] to unify the system, since
in such case, both signature and HIBE schemes use the same public key. It is
required to use multi-bit HIBE and signature scheme to have PKEET from Lee
et al.’s [9].
In what follows, we will denote by [id1.id2] the identity of a 2-level HIBE
scheme where id1 is the first level identity and id2 is the second level identity.
Below, we follow [9] to denote by [ID.0] (resp. [ID.1]) an identity in the second
level in which we indicate that ID is the identity of the first level.
4.1 Construction
Setup(λ)
On input security parameter λ, and a maximum hierarchy depth 2, set the
parameters q, n,m, σ¯, α¯. The vector σ¯ & α¯ ∈ R2 and we use σl and αl to
refer to their l- th coordinate.
1. Use algorithm TrapGen(q, n) to select a uniformly random n×m- matrix
A ∈ Zn×mq with a basis TA for Λ⊥q (A) and Λ⊥q (A′), respectively. Repeat
this Step until A has rank n.
2. Select uniformly random m×m matrices A1, A2, B ∈ Zn×mq .
3. Select a uniformly random matrix U ∈ Zn×tq .
4. We need some hash functions H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}t, H1 : {0, 1}∗ →
{−1, 1}t, H2 : {0, 1}∗ → Znq and a full domain difference map H ′ : Znq →
Z
n×n
q as in [1, Section 5].
5. Output the public key and the secret key
PK = (A,A1, A2, B, U) , SK = TA.
Enc(PP, ID,m)
On input the public key PK and a message m ∈ {0, 1}t do
1. Choose uniformly random s1, s2 ∈ Znq .
2. Choose x1,x2 ∈ Ψ tα and compute
c1 = U
T s1 + x1 +m
⌊q
2
⌋ ∈ Ztq,
c2 = U
T s2 + x2 +H(m)
⌊q
2
⌋ ∈ Ztq.
3. Choose l − 2 randomly matrices A3, · · · , Al ∈ Zn×mq .
4. Set vk = A3‖ · · · ‖Al and ID := H2(vk) ∈ Znq .
5. Build the following matrices in Zn×3mq :
FID.0 = (A|A1 +H ′(0) ·B|A2 +H ′(ID) ·B),
FID.1 = (A|A1 +H ′(1) ·B|A2 +H ′(ID) ·B).
6. Choose a uniformly random n× 2m matrix R in {−1, 1}n×2m.
7. Choose y1,y2 ∈ Ψmα and set z1 = RTy1, z2 = RTy2 ∈ Z2mq .
8. Compute
c3 = F
T
ID.0s1 + [y
T
1 |zT1 ]T ∈ Z3mq ,
c4 = F
T
ID.1s2 + [y
T
2 |zT2 ]T ∈ Z3mq .
9. Generate (D,TD)← TrapGen(n, q).
10. Let b := H1(c1‖c2‖c3‖c4) ∈ {−1, 1}l and define a matrix
F = (D|B +
l∑
i=1
biAi) ∈ Zn×2mq .
11. Extract a signature u ∈ Z2m×t by
u← SampleLeft(D,B +
l∑
i=1
biAi, TD, 0, σ).
Note that F · u = 0 mod q.
12. Output the ciphertext
CT = (c1, c2, c3, c4, vk,u, D).
Dec(PP, SK,CT)
On input a secret key SKID and a ciphertext CT, do
1. Parse the ciphertext CT into
(c1, c2, c3, c4, vk,u, D).
2. Let b := H1(c1‖c2‖c3‖c4) ∈ {−1, 1}l and define a matrix
F = (D|B +
l∑
i=1
biAi) ∈ Zn×2mq .
3. If F · u = 0 in Zq and ‖e‖ ≤ σ
√
2m then continue to Step 4; otherwise
output ⊥.
4. Set ID := H2(vk) ∈ Znq and build the following matrices:
FID.0 = (A|A1 +H ′(0) ·B|A2 +H ′(ID) ·B) ∈ Zn×3mq ,
FID.1 = (A|A1 +H ′(1) ·B|A2 +H ′(ID) ·B) ∈ Zn×3mq .
5. Generate
E0 ← SampleBasisLeft(A,A1 +H ′(0) ·B, TA, σ)
E1 ← SampleBasisLeft(A,A1 +H ′(0) ·B, TA, σ)
EID.0 ← SampleLeft(A|A1 +H ′(0) ·B,A2 +H ′(ID) · B,E0, U, σ)
s.t. FID.0 ·EID.0 = U mod q
EID.1 ← SampleLeft(A|A1 +H ′(1) ·B,A2 +H ′(ID) · B,E1, U, σ)
s.t. FID.1 ·EID.1 = U mod q.
6. Compute w← c1 − ETID.0c3 ∈ Ztq.
7. For each i = 1, · · · , t, compare wi and ⌊ q2⌋. If they are close, output
mi = 1 and otherwise output mi = 0. We then obtain the message m.
8. Compute w′ ← c2 − ETID.1c4 ∈ Ztq.
9. For each i = 1, · · · , t, compare w′i and ⌊ q2⌋. If they are close, output
hi = 1 and otherwise output hi = 0. We then obtain the vector h.
10. If h = H(m) then output m, otherwise output ⊥.
Td(SKi)
On input the secret key SKi(= TAi) of a user Ui, then generates tdi := Ei,1
as in Step 5 in Decryption process, i.e.,
tdi ← SampleBasisLeft(Ai, Ai,1 +H ′(0) ·Bi, TAi , σ)
Test(tdi, tdj ,CTi,CTj)
On input trapdoors tdi, tdj and ciphertexts CTi,CTj of users Ui and Uj
respectively, for k = i, j, do the following
1. Parse CTk into
(ck,1, ck,2, ck,3, ck,4, vkk,uk, Dk).
2. Sample EIDk.1 ∈ Z3m×tq from
EIDk.1 ← SampleLeft(Ak|Ak,1 +H ′(1) · Bk, Ak,2 +H ′(ID) ·Bk, tdk, U, σ)
3. Use EIDk.1 to decrypt ck,2, ck,4 as in Step 8-9 of Dec(SK,CT) above to
obtain the hash value hk.
4. If hi = hj then ouput 1; otherwise output 0.
Theorem 3 (Correctness). The above PKEET is correct if the hash function
H is collision resistant.
Proof. Since we employ the multi-bit HIBE and signature scheme from [1], their
correctness follow from [1]. The Theorem follows from [9, Theorem 1].
4.2 Parameters
We follow [1, Section 8.3] for choosing parameters for our scheme. Now for the
system to work correctly we need to ensure
– the error term in decryption is less than q/5 with high probability, i.e.,
q = Ω(σm3/2) and α < [σlmω(
√
logm)]−1,
– that the TrapGen can operate, i.e., m > 6n log q,
– that σ is large enough for SampleLeft and SampleRight, i.e., σ > lmω(
√
logm),
– that Regev’s reduction applies, i.e., q > 2
√
n/α,
Hence the following choice of parameters (q,m, σ, α) from [1] satisfies all of the
above conditions, taking n to be the security parameter:
m = 6n1+δ , q = max(2Q,m2.5ω(
√
logn))
σ = mlω(
√
logn) , α = [l2m2ω(
√
logn)]
(3)
and round up m to the nearest larger integer and q to the nearest larger prime.
Here we assume that δ is such that nδ > ⌈log q⌉ = O(log n).
Theorem 4. The PKEET constructed in Section 4.1 with paramaters as in (3)
is IND-ID-CCA2 secure provided that H1 is collision resistant.
Proof. The HIBE is IND-sID-CPA secure by [1, Theorem 33] and the signature
is strongly unforgeable by [1, Section 7.5]. The result follows from [9, Theorem
5].
Theorem 5 ([9, Theorem 3]). The PKEET with parameters (q, n,m, σ, α) as
in (3) is OW-ID-CCA2 provided that H is one-way and H1 is collision resistant.
Proof. The HIBE is IND-sID-CPA secure by [1, Theorem 33] and the signature
is strongly unforgeable by [1, Section 7.5]. The result follows from [9, Theorem
6].
